Introduction
The green paradox refers to an outcome in which climate policies such as carbon taxes, which are aimed at reducing carbon emissions, instead have the opposite effect: emissions increase, at least for some period of time. The recent debate about the green paradox was initially triggered by Sinn (2008) , who focused on one specific reason for this paradoxical outcome: the effect of climate policies on the long-run profits (more specifically, scarcity rents) that owners of fossil resources expect to earn from selling their resources over time. More recently, the term green paradox has been used to more broadly describe unintended consequences of climate policies.
For economists, the solution to environmental problems like climate change is a Pigovian tax (i.e., a tax that is equal to the social marginal damage from emissions) or an equivalent policy. However, for political reasons, it is likely that a carbon tax will not be set according to the Pigovian principle but rather will start low and then rise over time. A green paradox arises if this policy backfires and the environmental problem worsens. The culprit here is the reaction on the supply side of the fossil fuel market. Because fossil fuels are nonrenewable resources, their prices reflect not only the cost of production but also their scarcity. Thus, owners of fossil fuels enjoy scarcity rents and maximize their profits by deciding when to extract their coal, oil, or gas reserves. If a future tightening of climate policy threatens to decrease future scarcity rents, then to maximize profits, fossil fuel owners will decide to extract less in the future and extract more today instead. This forward shift in extraction is known as the weak green paradox. If, despite climate policy, resource owners can still extract almost all of their resources profitably, then the *Svenn Jensen is assistant professor at the Norwegian University of Life Sciences; e-mail: svenn.jensen@gmail.com.
forward shift in extraction might actually increase cumulative damages-an outcome known as a strong green paradox.
Ever since Sinn (2008) first coined the term green paradox, a broad debate has emerged in the climate economics literature concerning the validity of the underlying theoretical argument for the green paradox as well as its importance for efforts to curb global climate change. Although the term green paradox is relatively new, the effects of taxation on the timing of resource extraction have been studied before (see, e.g., Sinn 1982; Long and Sinn 1985) . Moreover, earlier papers also call attention to both the complexities of identifying the optimal carbon tax path and the potentially harmful consequences of well-intended but naïve policies (Sinclair 1992 (Sinclair , 1994 Ulph and Ulph 1994) .
The purpose of this article is to introduce this symposium on the Green Paradox and Climate Policy Design and, through a simple model and a review of the literature, provide both the intuition for the green paradox and a sense of its importance for policy makers. We focus in particular on intertemporal carbon leakage (shifts in carbon emissions between time periods) and discuss the factors that strengthen or weaken the case for the existence of such intertemporal effects.
It is not possible here to address all climate policy issues that are related to the Green Paradox, including the role of strategic behavior on resource markets (see, for example, Gerlagh and Liski 2011) , the interaction with capital markets (see, e.g., van der Meijden et al. 2014) , and uncertainty about future policies (see, e.g., Hoel 2010) . The two other articles in this symposium focus on two issues that are at the core of the current debate about climate and energy policycarbon leakage, both over time (intertemporal leakage) and across country borders (spatial leakage), and the role of clean energy alternatives and their impacts on economic growth.
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In the first article, Long (2015) focuses on climate policies in a world that is globally connected by trade but in which policies are either not coordinated at all or coordinated by only a subgroup of countries. Long identifies the channels through which both spatial leakage and intertemporal leakage arise in such a world. By distinguishing between static and dynamic approaches, he identifies the role of reallocation across space and time. He shows that border tax adjustments, which are often hailed as the solution to the negative repercussions of unilateral policies, create additional, green-paradox-type effects if more than one period is considered.
In the second article, van der Ploeg and Withagen (2015) discuss the interaction between scarce fossil fuels (such as oil and gas), clean backstop technologies (such as renewables and nuclear fusion), and dirty backstops (such as coal). More specifically, they analyze the long-run consequences of varying degrees of substitutability between clean and fossil energy and the related effects of promoting clean energy. They also provide insights on the implications of upward sloping supply schedules for renewables as well as insights on spatial leakage and green innovation. Finally, the authors offer both economic intuition and technical details concerning the potential trade-offs between the weak and strong green paradox on the one hand and growth and climate policies on the other.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: In the next section, we explain the Hotelling rule and introduce a simple dynamic model to provide intuition for the mechanisms underlying the green paradox. We then present numerical simulations of carbon taxation to illustrate the green paradox. This simple model makes a number of restrictive assumptions that affect the outcome. Thus, the third section reviews the theoretical literature on the green paradox and discusses what happens when theoretical models use less restrictive assumptions. This is followed by a discussion of the current limited empirical evidence for the green paradox. The final section summarizes our findings and discusses the extent of the policy challenge posed by the green paradox.
The Green Paradox -An Illustration of the Hotelling Rule
As noted in the introduction, the green paradox arises as a result of the dynamic nature of the supply response from fossil resource owners. Because fossil fuels are economically scarce, their equilibrium prices are higher than their extraction costs. Thus, in theory, the main consideration for resource owners is when to extract in order to maximize returns. Resource owners with tenure security will maximize the net present value of profits by distributing extraction over time such that the resource rent increases at the rate of discount. This is known as the Hotelling Rule, first demonstrated by Harold Hotelling in his 1931 paper "The economics of exhaustible resources," which was a response to concerns that profit maximizing resource owners might be over-extracting exhaustible resources. Hotelling (1931) found that if there are no external costs from the use of fossil fuels, then the extraction rate that resource owners will choose in order to maximize their profits will also be the socially optimal use of fossil fuels over time.
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Because climate change is such a serious external cost of fossil fuel use, it invalidates the simple Hotelling result. The role of climate policy is to internalize this cost. However, if climate policy ignores the Hotelling rule for supply side behavior, then a policy-driven shift in future demand may cause a green paradox outcome.
A Simple Model
To illustrate the mechanism underlying the green paradox we use a two-period model of the resource market. This model is a simplified version of the original Sinn (2008) model, but it replicates his main result that policy intervention can lead to faster exhaustion of nonrenewable resources.
For simplicity, we assume that the demand function for fossil fuels in each period is linear and unchanging between periods.
3 Such a function sets an upper limit on the resource price, known as the choke price. Above the choke price, demand for fossil fuels becomes zero, implicitly because perfect substitutes for fossil energy are cheaper. The stock of fossil resources is known and the resource price is determined in perfect competition among suppliers. There is perfect foresight over the entire time horizon. Marginal production costs are constant such that the resource rent is the difference between price and marginal costs. The representative resource owner will maximize the sum of profits over the planning horizon subject to the resource constraint and given a market interest rate. Damages from climate change depend only on the 2 This is true as long as the private discount rate is the same as the social discount rate and there is perfect competition in the resource market.
stock of carbon in the atmosphere. Thus, we ignore the delays in atmospheric carbon accumulation and temperature increases.
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Solving the producer's optimization problem reveals that the present value of the resource rent should be equal in all periods. Using the market clearing condition, we find that the resource is extracted completely and extraction is smoothly distributed over the time horizon.
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If there are no externalities, then this market outcome is socially efficient. However, there are externalities because burning fossil fuel causes emissions, which cause climate change.
Suppose policy makers announce today that they will impose a carbon tax in a few years in order to reduce emissions and damages from climate change. This "pre"-announcement divides the resource owner's planning horizon into two periods: before ("today") and after ("tomorrow") the tax is introduced. In this case, the representative resource owner will still maximize profits over all periods, but the producer price after the introduction of the tax is now the consumer price minus the tax. Now the resource owner will equalize the present value of the resource rent by extracting more of the resource today (pre-tax) and less tomorrow (post-tax). The owner will still extract all of the resource because each unit still yields rents.
Numerical Illustrations of Model Dynamics
To illustrate the dynamics of our simple model and the impact of taxation, we present simple numerical simulations (see Figures 1 and 2) . The model parameters are roughly calibrated to data on the current world crude oil market. Before the fall of oil prices in 2014, in the relatively stable 2011-2013 period, extraction and price were approximately 30 billion barrels (EIA 2015) and $100 per barrel (World Bank 2015), respectively. According to Sinn (2012) , unit extraction and exploration costs were on average 17 percent of market prices during the 2005-2009 period. Thus, we choose a constant marginal extraction cost of $20 per barrel. We set total reserves at 1000 billion barrels, which is somewhat lower than current estimates of proven reserves 6 and assume no further discoveries. We assume the real interest rate is 3 percent, which is similar to the average returns on UK treasury bonds. As shown in Figure 1 , if no carbon tax is introduced at any time, the resource is completely extracted after 53 years (see the solid black line for the extraction path), at which point the oil price reaches the assumed choke price of $400 per barrel (see solid gray line for the price path). 7 Less and less oil is extracted each year because the scarcity rent is rising over time.
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In a more formal presentation of the model, resource owners maximize profits from extracting the resource from now to infinity and discount future profits at the rate of interest: If it is announced that this tax will be implemented by 2030, then resource owners will respond by shifting their extraction so that more oil is extracted before 2030 and less is extracted after 2030 than if there were no tax (see the dashed black line in Figure 1 ). The dashed grey line indicates the consumer price path that corresponds with a carbon tax being introduced in 2030. The dotted grey line in Figure 1 indicates the after-tax producer price, which rises smoothly so that the scarcity rent rises at the rate of interest, in accordance with the Hotelling rule. In fact, it is to fulfill the Hotelling rule that resource owners respond to the carbon tax by redistributing extraction over time (i.e., more is extracted earlier and less is extracted later). So the preannouncement of a tax creates a green paradox. In our simple model, this "preannouncement" of a carbon tax can readily be interpreted as the mere expectation by fossil fuel owners of such a future tax. This suggests that the scientific and political debate about climate change in recent years may have already triggered a green paradox.
Impact of an Immediate Carbon Tax
It is important to note that a carbon tax that is implemented immediately may also generate a green paradox if the tax rate increases fast enough. In this context, "fast enough" means faster than the rate of interest, so that the present value of the tax is increasing over time. Committing to the implementation of such a tax path is equivalent to threatening to introduce new additional taxes every year, thus creating incentives each year to extract scarce fossil fuels immediately rather than in later years. Like policy announcements, such policies continuously lower future returns and thus could result in a redistribution of extraction and rents from later to earlier periods. This outcome is illustrated in Figure 2 , which shows that a fast growing tax induces a green paradox effect. This is the basic policy scenario discussed by Sinn (2008) . More specifically, Figure 2 shows that a carbon tax that increases at a rate higher than the rate of Figure 2 The impact of an immediate carbon tax on quantities of oil extracted Notes: The figure indicates quantities of oil extracted under three scenarios for a carbon (C) tax that is introduced in 2015: a tax that rises at the rate of interest (3 percent), a tax that increases at a rate higher than the rate of interest (4 percent), and a tax that is constant over time. The initial C tax here is set to the value of the U.S. social cost of carbon for 2015 of $39 per ton of CO 2 (U.S. EPA 2013). The calibration of the demand function is the same as in Figure 1 . Source: Authors' calculations.
The Green Paradox: The Unintended Consequences of Climate Policiesinterest leads to a forwarding of emissions, while a carbon tax that is constant over time delays emissions. A carbon tax that rises at the rate of interest would have no effect on extraction because the present value of current and future profits would be affected equally. Thus, Figures 1 and 2 together suggest that the green paradox will likely be exacerbated if the carbon tax both increases rapidly and is preannounced.
Implications of Higher Earlier Emissions
What happens to damages if future climate policies are expected or if a carbon tax rises fast enough over time? In the model just discussed, taxation does not prevent resource owners from extracting all resources over time. Because extraction costs are the same for all units extracted and taxation is not prohibitively high, extraction is profitable down to the very last unit of the resource. This means that the only change due to taxation concerns the time profile of extraction. More resources are extracted (and burned) earlier, which implies that damages arise earlier. Thus, climate policies that were designed to discourage fossil fuel use actually accelerate climate change, increasing the net present value of damages. In our simple model, the only way that a carbon tax would actually reduce total fossil fuel use and hence total emissions would be if the tax were so high that it completely choked demand and reduced the resource rent to zero. The most important reason for complete exhaustion in our simple model is that the model does not consider stock dependent extraction costs (i.e., costs that depend on how much of the resource has already been extracted). If we include stock dependent costs, then complete exhaustion and higher damages are no longer given. This is closely related to the distinction between the weak and the strong green paradox. The weak green paradox concerns only the immediate effect of climate policies and is said to arise when emissions increase in the short run. A strong green paradox refers to an outcome in which climate policies actually lead to an increase in climate damages in the long run (Gerlagh 2010) .
The Importance of Underlying Assumptions
The simple model we have presented here is helpful in identifying the driving mechanism behind the green paradox-i.e., the dynamic supply response of resource owners to the shift in future rents caused by different types of policies. Yet our numerous simplifying assumptions render the model too abstract for policy makers to evaluate whether this dynamic supply response poses a serious problem. Specifically, we assumed a homogenous, known, and absolutely scarce fossil fuel resource, constant unit extraction costs, costless and immediate adjustment of capacities, and a global policy maker able to implement future climate policies. Furthermore, the only policy measure we considered was a tax on carbon emissions. We ignored the role of alternative energy sources as well as policy measures to support their development and deployment. We did not consider the fact that it takes time to ramp up production and consumption of fuel use. Although these types of simplifying assumptions are necessary in order to highlight the key mechanisms at work, it is important to examine each of them in more detail to determine which are vital to a green paradox outcome. In the next section, we review the literature on the green paradox and present results that address these simplifying assumptions.
Theoretical Underpinnings of the Green Paradox
There are many difficulties in trying to empirically identify green paradox effects. Therefore, the main tools used in the green paradox literature are theoretical modeling and simulations. We do not present a comprehensive review of this literature here. Rather, we discuss the literature thematically, according to the features that specific studies add to the simple model we presented earlier.
10 These features are: the shape of the damage function, endogenous total extraction, substitutability between different fossil fuels, the role of clean energy substitutes, and spatial carbon leakage.
The Shape of the Damage Function
The impact of an increase in early emissions on overall damages, and hence the likelihood of experiencing a strong green paradox, depends on the shape of the climate damage function (i.e., the functional relationship between climate damages and the timing and amount of emissions).
In the simple damage function assumed in the previous section, damages depend only on cumulative emissions and rise smoothly when these emissions increase. The real climate system may feature nonlinearities and even tipping points (i.e., critical thresholds at which a small further increase in temperature can qualitatively alter the development of the system).
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With such a complex system, it is also possible that a faster increase in emissions could cause a significant increase in damages. If there are no such effects and it is only the value of cumulative emissions that determines the behavior of the system, the change in overall damages due to earlier extraction might be relatively small. However, while the change in damages due to earlier extraction might be more or less severe, it is important to emphasize that it is likely to be secondary to the effect of cumulative extraction remaining unchanged. That is, if we ultimately extract all recoverable fossil fuel reserves, scientists expect climate change to become so severe that the timing of emissions might become secondary.
12

Making Total Extraction Endogenous
If we adjust our assumptions in the simple Hotelling model to include stock-dependent, increasing marginal extraction costs, then a preannounced climate policy no longer necessarily implies an increase in cumulative damages. In this setting, climate policy might make it unprofitable to extract some resources. Untapped reserves are generally more difficult and expensive to extract than those already in production. If these costs rise sufficiently as extraction increases, not all resources will be extracted and scarcity becomes economical rather than physical. That is, under normal 10 For a more comprehensive review of these contributions, see van der Werf and di Maria (2012) , which presents technical details about modeling the green paradox. Also see Long (2015) and van der Ploeg and Withagen (2015) .
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These can be due, for example, to a sudden change in the Atlantic thermohaline circulation (see Lenton et al. 2008) . (2014) for the temperature sensitivity of damages.
The Green Paradox: The Unintended Consequences of Climate Policiesmarket conditions and with existing methods, not all remaining reserves can be recovered profitably. Nevertheless, resource rents still arise because extracting today makes future extraction more expensive. This setup is known as the Heal (1976) model. Total extraction becomes endogenous, and it is the resources that are cheap to extract that are scarce. The simple version of the Hotelling rule no longer applies. Instead, prices rise at the rate of interest minus a correction factor that accounts for the share of extraction costs in the resource price.
In the Heal model, the choke price of demand determines not only the price of the final unit of fossil fuel extracted but also the total amount that is extracted. For the final unit of fossil fuel, the marginal extraction cost equals the choke price. Any carbon tax levied on consumers will lower this choke price and thus cumulative extraction and emissions.
13 A weak green paradox (i.e., the shifting of extraction forward in time) will still arise if the carbon tax is preannounced or increases fast enough. To avoid a strong green paradox the tax must reduce cumulative emissions by enough to compensate for the negative welfare effect of increased early emissions. Whether this will occur depends on the social discount rate and the shape of the damage function (Van der Werf and di Maria 2012) . Because the simple Hotelling rule no longer holds, an emission tax that increases at the rate of interest is no longer neutral with respect to emission impacts, even if it is implemented unexpectedly and immediately. Rather, such a tax will reduce both near-term and total (i.e., cumulative) emissions. Total emissions go down because the choke price falls. Near-term emissions go down because the resource owner minimizes her loss by distributing the lower total extraction evenly over time. Near-term emissions will increase, causing a weak green paradox, only if the tax increases at a rate that is faster than the rate of increase in extraction costs (Hoel 2012) .
The effect of endogenizing total extraction and emissions is fairly robust to alternative specifications of rising extraction costs. For example, Fischer and Salant (2012) assume that there is a finite number of resource pools (i.e., reservoirs of the same resource that have different constant per unit costs of extraction). If a future carbon tax is announced, then resource owners will not bring high cost pools into production and will instead extract resources more quickly from those pools that are still profitable.
How much fossil fuel companies produce depends not only on their future costs of extraction but also on their abilities and costs of increasing or decreasing current production. Cairns (2014) argues that currently installed capacities constrain production for the next 5 years. Only if the lag between announcement and implementation is considerably longer than 5 years can new capacity be added. Whether this additional production capacity will be profitable depends on the new resource rents, the length of the policy lag, and the investment costs.
Before a fossil fuel company can extract the resource, it must first find it and install extraction infrastructure. This means that a future tax may also affect investment in exploration, either causing a "black gold rush" to find and sell the resources before they are worthless, or allowing investments to dry up as a result of the lower expected returns (Cairns 2014) . Moreover, because exploration requires highly specialized labor, lower expected returns may induce qualified professionals to leave or not enter the industry, thus raising production costs and possibly lowering future returns even further (Cairns 2014) .
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Resource demand falling to zero at some high price implicitly assumes the existence of an alternative energy source.
To summarize, increasing extraction costs render the strong green paradox (i.e., increased climate damages due to climate policy) less likely, and capacity constraints appear to limit the extent of the weak green paradox (i.e., a forward shifting of emissions).
Differences between Fossil Fuels
Next we examine the importance of accounting for the fact that there are different types of fossil fuels. Oil, natural gas, and coal all have high energy content, but they differ in their use, scarcity, production costs, and carbon content per unit of energy produced. In economic terms, they are imperfect substitutes; thus, considering oil, gas, and coal as different resources may affect the green paradox outcome.
Di Maria et al. (2012) consider two resources that are perfect substitutes in their use, but they differ in their pollution intensity. They show that if the cleaner resource is relatively scarce, there is another mechanism through which the lagged introduction of a climate policy, specifically an emissions cap, may increase emissions from the more pollution-intensive resource before the policy is implemented: because the cleaner resources become relatively more valuable under the emissions cap, fossil fuel owners optimally conserve the clean resource before the cap is enforced by switching to the dirtier resource. Similarly, Lemoine (2013) finds that future taxation may increase early extraction of the more emission-intensive fuel and depress extraction of the low-emission fuel. However, this outcome is not unambiguous and depends on the substitutability between the two fuels and the shape of their marginal cost functions, as well as the difference in the resources' emission intensities (and hence their tax rates).
This result can be turned on its head if we assume that the dirtier resource is abundant, which means that resource rents do not drive the decision of when to extract it. Michielsen (2014) analyzes the case where one fossil fuel is scarce and has a relatively low carbon intensity while the other is abundant and has a higher carbon intensity. He shows that in this case, anticipated climate policies might reduce emissions. Michielsen's back-of-the-envelope calibrations of his simple model for the oil and coal markets suggest that intertemporal leakage is small-0 percent to 8 percent of the policy's intended emissions reduction.
To summarize, the heterogeneity of fossil fuels, particularly their different emission intensities, can exacerbate the green paradox effect. Energy producers may initially switch to the dirtier fuel in response to a future tax. However, this result depends on specific assumptions about substitutability, the cost of extraction, and scarcity. Thus, to gain a better understanding of policy impacts, a careful calibration of models is needed that allows for different fossil resources.
The Role of Clean Energy Substitutes
Clean energy alternatives are crucial to any future scenario that includes a reduced dependence on fossil fuels. It is therefore important to examine how clean energy substitutes, and policies that support them, affect the green paradox.
The simplest way to introduce alternative energy into a model is with a backstop technology (Nordhaus 1973 ): a stylized clean energy technology that is a perfect substitute for fossil energy and is available in unlimited quantities. Generally, such a "perfect" backstop is assumed to be available at a constant marginal cost that is significantly higher than the initial fossil fuel The Green Paradox: The Unintended Consequences of Climate Policiesresource price. This marginal cost becomes the choke price at which demand for the exhaustible resource falls to zero. With constant extraction costs for fossil fuels (as in the basic Hotelling model), the explicit inclusion of a clean backstop technology does not change any of the key features of the model. Most importantly, the effects of carbon taxes remain the same (as long as the tax is lower than the fossil energy resource rent).
Explicitly including clean energy in the model opens up policy alternatives to a carbon taxlike subsidies and research and development support for the clean energy sources-which lower the marginal cost of the backstop technology or make it available sooner. Not surprisingly, the effects of such green subsidies depend critically on the extraction costs for fossil fuels. If these extraction costs are constant, then a cheaper backstop will shift forward the point in time at which all fossil fuel resources are exhausted and the world switches to clean energy. As with a carbon tax, although fossil fuel producers extract resources faster, the total amount of extraction remains the same as without subsidies to the backstop, resulting in a weak and a strong green paradox.
If the extraction costs for fossil fuels are increasing, then a cheaper backstop will induce fossil fuel owners to extract more at each point in time before the switch to the backstop. However, the switch to the backstop will occur both sooner and at a lower price, which means that total extraction and thus emissions will decrease. Hence, in this case, we are still facing a weak green paradox but are far less likely to induce a strong green paradox. The potential for a strong green paradox depends crucially on how fast fossil fuel extraction costs rise and how expensive the backstop is. Gerlagh (2010) shows that a strong green paradox may still arise, even if the extraction costs are convex (i.e., the marginal cost of extraction increases with extraction at a non-decreasing rate), when backstop costs are close to the choke price of demand. Van der Ploeg & Withagen (2012) confirm this result. A small reduction in cumulative extraction can be outweighed by a forward shift in production, causing damages to increase overall.
Fischer and Salant (2012) also examine backstop subsidies. Using a resource pool model in which pools differ only by extraction costs, they assume that the marginal cost of the backstop decreases over time and that the rate of this decrease (as opposed to a one-time decrease in the cost level) can be influenced by policy. They find that these different assumptions do not change the green paradox effects. If the green subsidy makes the most expensive fossil fuel pool unprofitable, there is a reduction in total fossil fuel production and production shifts forward in time. If the most expensive pool remains profitable, total fossil fuel production remains unchanged, but there is an acceleration of extraction.
These studies suggest that to avoid a strong green paradox, in the absence of a carbon tax, subsidies to clean energy need to be sufficiently high to eventually make the cost of clean energy lower than the cost of extraction.
In the real world, it seems unlikely that such a perfect backstop would be available anytime soon. For example, consider renewable energy from wind, solar, and biofuel. The performance of these technologies depends on the location of their installation, implying that once the best locations have been taken, marginal production costs start to rise. Is a green paradox more or less likely to arise for such imperfect backstops than for perfect backstops with constant marginal costs? Again, there is no simple answer. Whether a green paradox arises in the case of an imperfect backstop depends once more on the specific assumptions about climate damages and the cost level and dynamics of the backstop and the fossil fuels. To illustrate, Hoel and Jensen (2012) show that if fossil fuel owners anticipate a future cost reduction in renewables, the strong green paradox may or may not arise, depending, again, on the shape of the extraction cost function. On the other hand, Gerlagh (2010) finds that neither a weak nor a strong green paradox arises when an existing clean substitute becomes cheaper, assuming that energy demand is linear, extraction costs are constant, and the clean substitute has increasing marginal costs that start below extraction costs. Grafton et al. (2012) model biofuels as a perfect substitute for oil and with an upward sloping supply curve. Whether a biofuel subsidy causes a green paradox again depends on the assumptions about extraction costs, biofuel production costs, and the demand for energy. They show that with zero extraction costs, linear marginal costs for biofuels, and a linear demand for energy, a subsidy has no effect on the path of fossil fuel extraction: the supply of biofuels only generates its own additional energy demand. However, they find that a strong green paradox may arise if there are positive constant extraction costs and the marginal biofuel cost and demand are nonlinear.
Given these mixed results for policies that support clean energy, should these types of policies be recommended? In the long-run, we will need renewable energy technologies to substitute for fossil fuels. In terms of their effect on fossil fuel production decisions, policies to support clean energy development are generally very similar to carbon taxes. In particular, policies that have large effects on costs are more likely to reduce cumulative extraction than those that have small effects. Whether these effects are achieved by raising fossil fuel costs through taxation or lowering backstop costs through subsidies is of secondary importance.
Policy makers could also attempt to reduce carbon emissions by supporting carbon capture and storage (CCS). CCS is a proposed technology that severs the link between extracting fossil fuels and emitting carbon dioxide by capturing emissions (usually from point sources such as coal power plants) and depositing them somewhere (usually underground) to prevent them from reaching the atmosphere. This means that cumulative emissions can be reduced even if fossil fuel use is not. Because CCS is an end-of-pipe technology, it will always be more expensive than producing energy without abating emissions. Thus, an additional policy such as a carbon tax will be required. Then, if a future carbon tax causes a weak green paradox (i.e., increases near term emissions), a CCS subsidy will counteract this forward shift in production by making future fossil fuel use more attractive (Hoel and Jensen 2012) . 14 There are other policies for reducing dependence on fossil fuels besides directly subsidizing clean alternatives. Fischer and Salant (2012) examine two such policies: energy efficiency improvements and a mandate to blend fossil fuel and clean fuels. As with clean energy subsidies, the impact on total emissions depends on the magnitude of the policies. More specifically, if the improvement in efficiency or the blend mandate is large enough, total emissions will fall. However, because both of these policies continue to rely on fossil fuel and do not reduce its attractiveness relative to a clean substitute, the efficiency improvement and the blend mandate delay rather than accelerate extraction.
As our review of the literature has shown thus far, the effects of clean energy support depend crucially on the characteristics of the fossil resources' extraction costs as well as the level and dynamics of the costs of the alternative technologies. A strong green paradox cannot be excluded ex ante, even if a perfect clean backstop with constant costs and unlimited capacity 14 While no full scale CCS plant exists today, the IEA (2012) views CCS as an important bridge technology and hedging response for fossil fuel rich regions.
The Green Paradox: The Unintended Consequences of Climate Policiesis available. Although CCS, energy efficiency, and blend mandates appear to have some potential to counteract weak green paradox outcomes, they have their own caveats.
Spatial Carbon Leakage
Thus far we have treated the world as a single entity by assuming that climate policy is uniformly implemented across all countries. However, if individual countries' climate policies differ, fossil fuel producers may adjust not only the timing of production but also where they sell their fuel. This may result in spatial carbon leakage, whereby a reduction in fossil fuel consumption in one country causes world market prices to fall, which leads to an increase in consumption in another country.
How do spatial and intertemporal carbon leakage interact? Eichner and Pethig (2011) examine this issue in a model with two periods, today and tomorrow, and three countries: one sells fossil fuels and two consume it. One of the consuming countries implements a climate policy, while the other does not. They show that in this setting where spatial leakage is possible, a strong green paradox may arise not only from tightening future climate policy but also from tightening current climate policy. The authors find that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution between current and future consumption and the price elasticity of fuel demand play a crucial role in whether the green paradox arises from a tightening of future or current policies.
While Eichner and Pethig (2011) focus on unilateral quantity regulation (i.e., a cap on emissions in the country that implements climate policy), Hoel (2011) analyzes unilateral price regulations. Specifically, he examines the effects of constant carbon taxes that may or may not differ across regions in a Hotelling model of two regions with a clean backstop. When tax rates are the same across countries, he finds that choosing a higher but still constant tax can shift extraction from the present to the future (the opposite of a green paradox). When tax rates differ between countries, however, he finds that increasing the carbon tax in the region that initially had a lower carbon tax can speed up extraction and induce a strong green paradox. A reduction in the cost of the clean backstop (which benefits both regions) can decrease total damages from climate change and avoid the strong green paradox. This is true if the tax rates in the two regions are sufficiently different and demand is sufficiently inelastic. Thus, Hoel shows that Eichner and Pethig's result that spatial and intertemporal leakage interact holds not only for emission caps but also for taxation. In addition, Hoel highlights the potential advantages of complementing carbon policies with support for backstop technologies.
Fischer and Salant (2014a) also examine both spatial and intertemporal leakage in a model that, in contrast to Hoel (2011) , considers cost-reducing technological progress with respect to the backstop technology. Using a two-region, two-pool model, they analyze the effect of the size of a coalition of carbon-regulating countries and the effect of speeding up cost reductions in the backstop technology. They focus on cases where the backstop becomes cheaper than at least the most expensive resource pool before this pool is completely exhausted. If this were not the case, it would be profitable for the unregulated regions to eventually exhaust all fossil fuels completely. Fischer and Salant find that if backstop costs fall over time due to technological progress, then carbon-regulating countries (i.e., the coalition) can use emission taxes to reduce cumulative global emissions if their share of global fossil fuel demand is sufficiently large. More specifically, because total emissions are a decreasing function of emissions taxes, as well as the regulated share of world fossil fuel demand and the speed of cost reductions in the backstop, support for clean technologies may, for example, be an alternative to increasing the size of the coalition. Wei et al. (2012) extend the analysis of spatial and temporal leakage to the case where fossil fuel producing countries might react to climate policies with their own policy measures. They show that when importers impose a tax on oil, fossil producers will have an incentive to counteract this policy by increasing their subsidies to domestic fuel consumption. This can dramatically increase local, and even global, fossil consumption and in some cases also delay the use of the backstop technology. So spatial leakage might arise not only due to market-induced responses to climate policies but also due to regulatory responses in fossil fuel exporting countries.
These examples from the literature show that the implications of climate policies may change considerably if the model accounts for both intertemporal and spatial leakage. Thus, given the uncertainty about future global climate policy, it appears to be essential to consider the risk of spatial leakage in policy design. As one option, Harstad (2012) suggests a supply side climate policy. He argues that countries in a climate coalition should buy those fossil fuel deposits in non-coalition countries that would not be profitable to extract with a climate policy but are profitable without a policy. By owning the resources, the coalition can ensure that these reserves are never extracted. In effect, the coalition controls not only its own fossil fuel supply but also the supply in non-cooperating countries, thus eliminating leakage. However, this approach is subject to enforcement problems and the costs for the climate coalition are high. Moreover, a "never-extract" deposit market may increase incentives to search for new deposits and lead non-cooperating countries to invest more in reducing their extraction costs. Thus, the appeal of this supply side approach is likely to be limited in practice.
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Empirical Evidence on the Green Paradox
In this section, we discuss the research that has tried to empirically identify the effects found in the theoretical literature. We first discuss the empirical support for the Hotelling rule and the difficulties in explaining historical patterns in resource prices. We then discuss two empirical papers (Di Maria et al. 2013; Lemoine 2013) , which are, to our knowledge, the only existing empirical analyses of the green paradox.
Empirical Evidence for the Hotelling Rule
In the theoretical analyses we have discussed, one prerequisite for the green paradox to exist is that fossil fuel owners receive rents from their resources, and that those rents are a driving force in their extraction decisions. 16 Fossil fuel owners need to be forward looking such that if the future prospects for fossil fuel extraction decline, they will decide to shift extraction forward in time. There is no doubt that some fossil fuels yield rents. For example, Middle Eastern oil is 15 The challenges of such a policy are illustrated by the recent failed attempt of the Ecuadorian government to sell its "nonextraction" of oil in the Amazon rain forest. See http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/16/ ecuador-abandons-yasuni-amazon-drilling. 16 Smulders et al. (2012) show that there can be a green paradox in the absence of scarcity due to the effects of climate policy on capital accumulation and, ultimately, energy use. However, our focus here is on the scarcity-related green paradox.
The Green Paradox: The Unintended Consequences of Climate Policiescheap to extract and sells for much more than it costs to bring to the market. However, for other fossil resources such as coal, the case for scarcity rents is less certain. Thus, a priori empirical evidence for a green paradox resulting from rent shifting might be found, if at all, in only some fossil fuel markets.
What about forward looking behavior? For the Hotelling model to work, it is essential that resource owners are forward looking when planning extraction. The Hotelling model predicts that resource prices will increase over time. However, a review of historical data indicates that nonrenewable resource prices have not risen continuously over time (Livernois 2009; Spiro 2014) . While this failure of prices to rise might be explained by a number of factors-changes in fossil fuel supply and demand due to technological change, exploration of new reservoirs, revisions to the expected size of the resource base, or even political price manipulation-the sheer number of factors makes it all but impossible to identify the Hotelling rule. Indeed, incorporating them into a Hotelling model can generate almost any price path (Livernois 2009 ).
An alternative explanation for the lack of empirical evidence for the Hotelling rule is that resource owners' planning horizons might be too short for scarcity to play a role in their extraction decisions. For example, consider a model with a progressive finite time horizon. This means that resource owners plan extraction over a finite number of years (e.g., 20 years) but update their extraction plan on a regular basis (e.g., yearly). Spiro (2014) shows that such a model can generate the observed pattern of increasing extraction rates and nonincreasing resource prices. In effect, the model removes scarcity from the extraction decision (without giving up the assumption of forward-looking rational behavior). However, this result holds only until the resource stock has become small enough to be exhaustible within the finite time horizon. Spiro (2014) concludes that scarcity effects might play a bigger role in the future when resources become scarcer. This also suggests that green paradox effects that are driven by resource scarcity might not have been observable in the past but might become more relevant in the future.
Although anything related to the Hotelling rule or the Green Paradox is clearly difficult to confirm empirically, in principle, announced sudden policy changes might give us some opportunities for observation. Because of the difficulties associated with conducting empirical analyses of the green paradox, some researchers have attempted to simulate the effects of different climate policies in order to get a sense of the magnitude of green paradox outcomes under different policy scenarios (e.g., Michielsen 2014; Fischer and Salant 2014b) . 17 However, the results of this type of numerical exercise depend on the model set-up and the calibration of the parameters. This makes it difficult to assess their value and realism. Thus, we focus here on Di Maria et al. (2013) and Lemoine (2013) , the only econometric studies of the green paradox that, to our knowledge, have been conducted thus far.
Empirical Evidence from the U.S. Acid Rain Program
Because of a lack of data on climate change policies, Di Maria et al. (2013) instead analyze the announcement effect of the U.S. acid rain program on emissions of sulfur dioxide. The program puts a comprehensive, but not very strict, limit on SO 2 emissions, which are a by-product of coal-fired power plants. coal spot prices fell following the announcement of the program in 1990, which is consistent with green paradox effects. However, they do not find the expected increase in the quantities of coal extracted, neither overall nor specifically for high-sulfur coal. Thus, Di Maria et al. (2013) conclude that a speeding up of extraction, which is at the core of the green paradox effect, did not occur. However, the lack of a green paradox in their study might be due to the specific characteristics of the market and the announced policy. In particular, Di Maria et al. (2013) suggest several possible explanations for the lack of evidence of a green paradox outcome: (1) too short of a lag between the announcement and implementation of the policy to make it profitable to adjust the capacity of the power plants; (2) the plants were base load plants already producing at full capacity; (3) a lack of a liquid spot market and the prevalence of long-term coal purchase contracts; and (4) local and state-level regulations restricting SO 2 emissions were already in place. Thus, they conclude that although they did not find clear evidence for a green paradox in the case of the U.S. acid rain program, this does not rule out a green paradox arising in other contexts. Nevertheless, their study highlights some of the challenges of conducting empirical studies of the green paradox.
Empirical Evidence from U.S. Carbon Cap and Trade Legislation Lemoine (2013) analyzes the sudden collapse of carbon cap and trade legislation in the U.S. Senate in 2010, and its effect on coal and natural gas futures. He finds that for futures contracts that expired before the cap was to take effect, prices for both coal and natural gas rose in response to the collapse of the bill. He notes that expectations of a future cap had likely already depressed these prices before the bill failed to pass. Lemoine (2013) estimates that a moderate additional 12 million tons of CO 2 were emitted between the time that the initial discussions of the legislation began and the time at which the legislation was suddenly defeated.
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To summarize, the two empirical studies discussed here provide limited evidence for green paradoxes. Another challenge of such empirical analyses should also be kept in mind: identifying the full effects of national policies can be difficult because of spatial leakage (i.e., spillover effects on international markets). What ultimately matters for the climate are the impacts of policies on global CO 2 emissions. For example, the failure of U.S. carbon cap and trade legislation might have spilled over into world markets, causing changes in carbon emissions outside the United States as well.
Summary and Conclusions
The green paradox has sometimes been interpreted as suggesting that climate policies per se are ineffective or even harmful. However, this is not what the debate is about. Rather, the literature on the green paradox seeks to broaden the discussion of climate policy design to go beyond the current, almost exclusive, focus on demand side responses to also consider supply side reactions. The main issue for researchers and policy makers continues to be what type of policy to implement and how. This article has sought to introduce the reader to the debate about how supply side reactions might affect the outcome of climate policies. Using a very simple model, 18 In 2013, U.S. greenhouse gas emissions totaled 6,673 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalents (EPA 2014).
The Green Paradox: The Unintended Consequences of Climate Policieswe have presented the main mechanism driving potential paradoxical reactions to climate policy, i.e., the green paradox. But, we have also shown that whether or not economic theory predicts such a reaction depends on the assumptions made with respect to extraction costs, alternative energy sources, the size of the climate coalition, and even the level, dynamics, and combination of policies. As empirical analyses and thus empirical evidence on the green paradox are scarce, we focus here on key policy conclusions that can be drawn from this debate.
First, the strong green paradox reminds us that at some point we must make fossil energy unprofitable. Most importantly, to significantly reduce the risk of dangerous interference with the climate system, we must ensure that a large share of currently existing coal and unconventional gas and oil reserves remain unexploited (Meinshausen et al. 2009; McGlade and Ekins 2015) . Thus, policies should focus on reducing the cumulative amount of resources extracted. Ultimately, what we need is a limit (or cap) on cumulative emissions, also known as a carbon budget.
Second, as with other stocks of environmental goods, the rights to this global carbon budget must be allocated across time and space in order to avoid a "race" to the carbon budget ceilingwhich would result in a weak green paradox. The weak green paradox also has the potential to threaten an overall carbon target: if less carbon than expected can be emitted in the future because emissions increase today, there may be pressure to adjust the target upward. This race can be avoided implicitly through a carbon tax or explicitly through a cap-and-trade scheme.
Third, a carbon tax should be designed with the green paradox in mind. To avoid the strong green paradox, the tax must eliminate the resource rents for those reserves that we should not extract. Such a tax would not only need to be sufficiently high but also global. To prevent the weak green paradox, the literature suggests that one should avoid preannouncing high, future taxes as well as taxes that start very low and rise fast.
Fourth, a weak green paradox can also occur with a global cap and trade program if the policy is preannounced or anticipated. However, there is no weak green paradox effect that is analogous to the one induced by a fast-rising carbon tax, because even if the annual cap falls "quickly," overall emissions in each period are determined by the emission cap. This slightly favors quantity controls in the face of the green paradox. However, neither a global tax nor a global cap and trade system appears to be politically feasible at this time.
Fifth, we have seen that support for renewable energy causes a strong green paradox only if renewables are expensive. Costs of renewables have already declined considerably in recent decades, reducing the risk of a strong green paradox. However, if a global agreement on climate policy cannot be reached, the cost of renewables needs to become lower than the cost of extraction in order to avoid spatial leakage by also keeping fossil resources in the ground in unregulated regions. Support for renewables could also be supplemented by taxes or quotas, which would further improve their cost-competitiveness and push them down the learning curve by bringing them to scale.
Interestingly, we may already be experiencing the weak green paradox today. Fossil fuel suppliers anticipate stringent future policies not only from actual policy announcements but also from following the scientific and political debates on climate change.
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The internal carbon prices that some international energy companies have published and claim to use in their investment decisions suggest that they are expecting tougher climate policies. For example, Exxon has said that it expects a future carbon cost of $60 per ton CO 2 in OECD countries by 2030 (ExxonMobil 2012). support for this can be found in recent predictions of a "new normal" of low oil prices combined with unchanged levels of extraction, and suggestions by bank and business analysts that this situation stems from oil producers trying to sell their resources before stricter climate policies are enacted (Theurer 2015) .
Unfortunately, the current literature does not provide sufficient information to make a final assessment of the long-run effects of climate policies in a multicountry world faced with a scarcity of fossil resources that includes both dirtier and cleaner substitutes. Thus, the development of models that can account for intertemporal and spatial leakage and substitutability across energy sources, and that are carefully calibrated to the data, should be a priority for future research on the green paradox.
